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the c i v i l s e r v i c e and the j u d i c i a r y , were d e f i n e d . On the 
f i r s t Independence anniversary the c o n s t i t u t i o n was amended 
to prov ide f o r a ceremonial p r e s i d e n t to r e p l a c e the 
Governor-General . 
On the o c c a s i o n o f opening the f i r s t Independence. 
Parl iament the Queen's r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , the Duke o f Kent , 
members o f the c o a l i t i o n UPC-KY government and, to some 
e x t e n t , members o f the O p p o s i t i o n were i n a sanguine 
s e l f - c o n g r a t u l a t o r y mood. The Duke o f Kent promised t h a i 
h i s Government "would f o s t e r the s p i r i t o f t o l e r a n c e and 
goodwi l l between a l l the p e o p l e s o f Uganda - I t would -
pay due heed to the t r a d i t i o n a l b e l i e f s and customs o f the 
d i v e r s e p e o p l e s o f Uganda. I t would r e s p e c t i n d i v i d u a l 
r i g h t s o f the oommon man. I t ' would r e c o g n i s e the s p e c i a l 
s t a t u s and d i g n i t y o f the Hered i tary Ru le rs o f the Kingdoms 
and o f the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Heads o f the D i s t r i c t s " . 
I n equal measure, the Prime M i n i s t e r , Apolo M i l t o n Obote:, 
b e l i e v e d that " ' t r a d i t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s would form a f i r m 
f oundat i on upon which our newly independent s t a t e cou ld be _ 3 
advanoed." The l e a d e r o f the Oppos i t i on , B a s i l B a t a r i n g a y s 
however, oautioned aga ins t " ' t r iba l i sm and f a c t i o n a l i s m , our: 
two most deadly enemies - and u n l e s s we sen . a c q u i r e - • 
a sense o f common purpose? - we can never be sure that our 
f u t u r e path vri.ll be; e n t i r e l y smooth1^- -
Within a space o f l e s s than f o u r y e a r s another a c t o r 
v/ho had never been p e r t o f the p o l i t i c a l c a l c u l a t i o n s 
l e a d i n g to independence- came to the s cene . This was t h e 
Uganda Army. On the 25th January, 1964, there was an army 
mutiny whose o b j e c t i v e s were apparent ly l i m i t e d ; i t was 
suppressed . I n 1966, wi th an army purged o f h i s opponents, 
' • i 
M i l t o n Obote overthrew the 1962 c o n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangemer a, 
chased out S i r . Edward Muteesa I I , Kabaka o f Buganda and 
P r e s i d e n t o f Uganda, i n t r o d u c e d an I n t e r i m C o n s t i t u t i o n , 
f o l l o w e d by the 1967 C o n s t i t u t i o n and r u l e d , b a s i c a l l y with 
army s u p p o r t , u n t i l he. was overthrown i n "the 1971 January 
coup. Prom 1971 to 1 9 7 8 , I d i Amin used the army as an 
instrument o f r u l e u n t i l he was overthrown by a combination 
o f Tanzanian and Ugandan f o r c e s . I n s p i t e o f the m i s g i v i n g s 
about the a c t i v i s t r o l e o f the m i l i t a r y i n p o l i t i c s and 
some apparent e f f o r t s to d e f i n e i t s p l a c e i n the Uganda by 
Nat iona l l i b e r a t i o n Front reg imes , the Uganda M i l i t a r y has 
been, a c t i v e l y i n v o l v e d i n the Ugandan p o l i t i o a l p r o c e s s e s . ' 
. From 1981 u n t i l J u l y , 1985, Uganda was embro i led i n a C i v i l 
War., w i th the Nat ional Resistance, army seeking to over throw 
. .Obote. Under, harasanent from the NRA, Obote was overthrown 
by the Uganda Nat ional l i b e r a t i o n Army l e d by "The O k e l l o s " 
who, i n turn , we re swept out by the Nat ional R e s i s t a n c e 
Movement. 
The o b j e c t i v e o f t h i s paper i s to e x p l a i n the 
c i roumstances t h a t have, g iven r i s e to the p o l i t i o a l a c t i v i s t 
r o l e o f the Ugandan M i l i t a r y . S .P. Huntington, i n h i s 
i n c i s i v e s t u d y , a t t r i b u t e s the i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t r o l e o f the-
m i l i t a r y i n the p o l i t i c s o f changing soo i e - t i e s to a s t a t e o f 
p o l i t i o a l i n s t i t u t i o n a l normlessness , a s i t u a t i o n i n whiah 
there are no w i d e l y accepted and l e g i t i m a t e prooedures f o r 
r e s o l v i n g c o n f l i c t s , s l iort o f p h y s i c a l show o f f o r c e . I n such 
a s i t u a t i o n sooiaL p o l i t i c a l f o r c e s are h i c h l v nnlH +tf M oo/i 
and are a l l competing to advance i n t e r e s t s peoul iar to 
themselves through ru les o f the game they seek to d i c ta te 
to other oompeting soc ia l p o l i t i c a l f o r c e s , The mi l i tary 
dramatically enter the p o l i t i c a l arena sLmply beoause they 
happen to have the advantage of the means of ooers ion. 
Writes Huntington: 
"Each group employs means which r e f l e c t 
i t s peculiar, nature- ana c a p a b i l i t i e s . The 
wealthy '.on.be; student3 r i c t workers s t r ike , 
mobs demonstrate and the mi l i tary ooup. In 
the absence o f accepted procedures, a l l these 
forms of d i r e c t ac t ion are found on the 
•y i p o l i t i o a l scene. The techniques o f , m i l i t a r y 
intervent ion are simply more drama'ti o _and 
e f f e c t i v e : than the others because as Hobbes 
puts i t 'when nothing e l se i s turned up, clubs 
are trumps* 
Huntington's model can go a long way to explain the 
ciroumstanoes t h a t have l e d the Ugandan mi l i tary to play 
a p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i s t , r o l e i n the Ugandan p o l i t i o a l processes . 
The major argument of the paper i s that the p o l i t i c a l 
a c t i v i s t r o l e o f the mi l i ta ry i n Ugand&ihas been the r e s u l t 
o f f a i l u r e on the p a r t . o f successive Ugf i a p o l i t i c a l 
leaderships to work out widely accepted inst i fr i tLonal ized 
means of r e so lv ing c o n f l i c t s by peace fu l means.^ P o l i t i c a l 
leaderships operate: within the formal r u l e s only to the 
extent to which these r u l e s t a c t i c a l l y serve the i r i n t e r e s t s 
and are only too ready to operate outside these r u l e s when 
i t serves tha i r i n t e r e s t s . The Ugandan mi l i tary i s not 
insulated from th is i n s t i t u t i o n l e s s arena. I t beoame a 
p o l i t i c a l actor when compeio.ting s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l f o r c e s , 
i n a b id to t i l t the bala" ce i n their favour , sought the 
support o f the mi l i tary . The resu l t was that the Ugandan 
mi l i ta ry , a f t e r Independence, was b u i l t , expanded and equipped 
i n reisponse to internal p o l i t i c a l cum mi l i tary arises which, 
i n turn, u l t imate l ly l ed to i t s nakedly a c t i v i s t r o l e on i t s 
own terms. 
•j- She Uganda Mi l i tary i n the Making 
On Independence day the presence of the Ugandan 
mi l i tary was only marked by a few troops which took part 
i n the oeremonies and by a young o f f i c e r , Karugaba, who had 
r e c e n t l y passed out from the Royal Mi l i tary Academy, 
Sandhurst. Karugaba was the Aft-de-de-CamP to the Duke of 
Kent, the Queen's representative at the Independence c e r e -
monies. At the time of Independence the Uganda R i f l e s , 
the sucoesscr to the co l on ia l army, the King 's African 
R i f l e s , oonsisted of only one bat ta l ion o f about a thousand 
men, the greater majority of whom had been recru i ted from 
the then Northern Province, espec ia l ly from Aohol i . The 
R i f l e s were, at the time of Independence, o f f i o e r e d by 
B r i t i s h o f f i c e r s , seconded from their metropolitan uni ts . 
For i t s s i ze and equipment, the Uganda R i f l e s had 
overwhelming tasks to perform. I t was deployed to maintain: 
law and order i n Various partB of the oountry where there 
werB tensions aris ing from attempts at Beo.ession among the 
Bamba/Bakonjo from the l o ro Kingdom, c a t t l e rus t l ing in 
Karamoja, and the sp i l l over e f f e c t s from the o i v i l d i s t u r -
bances i n the Congo, the Sudan and Ruanda. 
I t waB i n response to the ahove tasks and, probably 
f o r symbolio reasons, that the Ugandan leadership saw a 
need to expand and equip the Uganda R i f l e s . I n i t i a l l y , 
the expansion was characterised by goodwill from the 
government and the oppos i t ion but also by some apparent 
caution with regard to expenditures involved and maintenance 7 
of "standards." A programme f o r expansion of the army and 
training an o f f i c e r corps was launched. In the budget f o r 
the f i n a n o i a l year 1962/65, the army estimates were doubled 
in order " to meet the f u l l c o s t o f maintaining our F i r s t 
Battal ion - f o r a f u l l f i n a n c i a l year" and i n order to 
bui ld another bat ta l i on i n Moroto. Provis ions were made 
f o r establishment of a training wing at J in ja f o r o f f i c e r 
cadets and arrangements were made with the Br i t i sh govern-
ment to have Ugandans trained at the Royal .Mil i tary Academy, 
Sandhurst and the school for . o f f i c e r cadets at Mons, 
Aldershott . Already by mid-1963, according to F e l i x Onama, 
Minister o f Internal A f f a i r s , there were 28 Ugandan o f f i c e r s 
serving i n the army and a fur ther 30 were undergoing 
t r a i n i n g . 8 A 
There was goodwill a l l around to expand the army and 
t ra in a Ugandan mi l i tary o f f i c e r corps. Onama's programme 
was endorsed by t i e Leader o f the Opposition, who,however, 
f e l t , uneasy about the a l l eged "highhandedness" of the 
expatriate o f f i c e r s with "other o f f i c e r s and the al leged 
p o l i t i c a l and regional considerat ions going into r e c r u i t -
q 
ment o f the Ugandan o f f i c e r oorps i n the making." 
But f o r a l l th i s programme of expansion and training, 
at th i s stage, the government appears to have been i n no 
hurry to unduly f u l l y Ugandanise the o f f i o e r oorps as i s 
evidenced i n the Pres ident ' s speech: 
"The expansion of the Uganda Army oontinues 
to go ahead as 'planned- I t i s the government's 
hope that by the end of 1964 e ight Company 
Commanders w i l l be Ugandans and that by the end 
of 1965 two Battal ion Commanders w i l l be 
Ugandans. I t w i l l be seen that i f th i s plan 
oomes to f r u i t i o n then the r o l e s o f those 
o f f i c e r s seconded to us from the Br i t i sh Armed 
Poroes w i l l gradually change and . i t is.'hoped 
that they w i l l remain i n an advisory capac i ty - " 
Thus, aooording to the President, a Uganda Army f u l l y 
commanded and e f f i c e r e d by Ugandans would go. aooording to 
the timetable which would take a couple of years from the . 
date of the Pres ident ' s speeoh. But on the 25th January, 
1965, the Government leaders were rudely j o l t e d out of 
the ir timetable when men of the F i r s t Battal ion at J in ja 
refused to obey orders os tens ib ly demanding pay increases 
and improvement in the i r condit ions , general ly . Deta i l s o f 
What happened need not: detain us here1"L but the s i gn i f i cance 
of the mutiny l i e s in the government'S reac t i on to the 
inc ident , the i r interpretat ion of the events and the 
p o l i t i o o - m i l i t a r y consequences arising from the inc ident a t 
J i n j a . 
The government immediately acted- approached the B r i t i s h 
government f o r mil i tary assistance to quel l the mutiny1"2. 
The Br i t i sh government promptly sent a b a t t a l i o n from the 
Sta f fordshire Regiment who took contral o f the s i tuat ion 
immediately on their arr iva l and disarmed the mutinous troops . 
Men of the Headquarters Company and A Company were dismissed. 
A Court-Martial was set up to try the r ing leaders . By the 
14th March, 1964, men of the Staf fordshire Regiment were 
ready to go . 
- 8 --
I t now remained, f o r the leadership to taice a_ post-mortem 
o f the January events. Abdala Anyuru introduced a motion i n 
Parliament regret t ing the events i n J in ja ' "but do note vdth 
great appreciat ion and s a t i s f a c t i o n the promptness with 
which government dealt with the situation- ' '^? The o f f i c i a l 
in te rpre ta t i on i s worth not ing : The event had no p o l i t i c a l 
impl i ca t i ons ; i t " was an i s o l a t e d incident involving men of 
•r 
the Headquarters Company and A Company who had gone on str ike 
over pay and, therefore , the i r deplorable behaviour could 
not be generalised with respect to the Ugandan mil itary as 
an i n s t i t u t i o n 1 ^ . 
'^ .'he occas ion however, provided the members to a i r the i r 
views about thair army with part i cu lar reference to the i r 
Par t i cu lar r o l e and to the regional imbalance within the 
m i l i t a r y . I-"artin Okello 'was not happy with the way the-
governing party had a l legedly ingrat iated i t s e l f with the 
mi l i tary during the e l e c t i o n preceding Independence, to 
which he attr ibuted the unhappy events at J in ja . Al l 
Kisekka was unhappy about the regional imbalance in the any 
favouring the Northern Region and i n th is he saw negative 
impl i ca t i ons f o r nat ion- building."1"^ But the Northern 
members were a l l out to defend the Doctrine of Bthno-
Punc t i ona l i sm 1 ^ with p a r t i c u l a r reference to the mi l i tary . 
For l a k i d i : 
"Some people are born to be good traders, 
some are born to be very good c i v i l servants, 
some are. born to protec t th i s country - The 
North has been heavi ly accused that the 
reoruitment i s a l l the time going to the 
North. I think many people should be grateful 
to the North, and par t i cu lar ly to'my t r ibe , 
Aohol i . The Acholi have pledged themselves 
to protect t h i s country. I f they are i n the 
army they have- got to be supported. - I f people 
are beginning to speak i n th is House to d i s -
c r e d i t than - the i r morale i n the army, the 
pol ioe . and pr i sons -would be lowered. " l i 
In the aftermath of January events, the mi l i tary gained 
more than they had bargained f o r . They obtained their pay 
the 
r i s e . Ay time of the mutiny, "there had been 55 o f f i c e r s , 
inoluding 2 majors and 14 captains and the r e s t l i e u t e n a t s . " 
Immediately a f t e r the mutiny, the command o f oompanies was 
taken over by Ugandans. Seven months a f t e r the mutiny, 
there was a b ig promotion exerc ise i n which nineteen Ugandan 
e f f i o e r s were promoted. Shaban Opolot was promoted to 
Brigadier and appointed Commander of the Uganda Army; I d i 
Arnin was promoted to Colonel and made Deputy Commander. 
The res t were promoted to ranks ranging from l i eutenant 19 
Colonel to Temporary Major, and Temporary Captain.-
I t i s worth noting^that i n the l i g h t o f l a t e r subsequent 
oomplaints about a predominantly Northern o f f i c e r corps, i n 
this promotion exerc i se , ethnic representation appeared 
somewhat balanced: 6 I t e s o , 3- Nubians, 4 Banyahlrore, 
2 Banyoro, 3 "West Ni l e rs " and 1 l a n g i . 
What were the p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y consequences of the 
mutiny? We have, already noted that the government tended, 
at l e a s t i n the publ i c , to regard the mutiny general ly as of 
l imited consequence. The mutiny r e f l e c t e d the f r a g i l i t y o f 
the p o l i t i o o - c i v i l i a n i n s t i t u t i o n s in the making; a f t e r the 
mutiny, i n e v i t a b l y , p o l i t i c i a n s had to take the mi l i tary as 
part of the i r p o l i t i c a l c a l c u l a t i o n s f o r surv iva l ; but there 
was no ser ious e f f o r t to wprk out p o l i t i o a l meohanisms f o r 
ensuring that o i v i l i a n supremacy prevai led over the m i l i t a r y . 
- 10 -... 
During the o r i t i c a l January days, the aotors i n 
containing the mutiny were. confined to Obote himself and 
a few cronies, the Brit ish government, and o f f i o e r s and men 
of the Staffordshire regiment. The p o l i t i c a l part ies had 
to content: themselves with Bending congratulatory messages 
a f ter the event, and Parliament had "to note with appre-
c iat ion and 'sat is fact ion with the way government had handled 
the situation"-. There had- been no' single c i v i l i a n soc ia l 
p o l i t i c a l f oroe to stand i n the way o f the mutineers. Obote 
had to • nwall.Ow h is prider'and inv i te the erstwhile co lon ia l 
power to protect the c i v i l i a n i n s t i t u t i o n s - hopeful ly . " 
In spi te of a l l the appearances, the vi s i t e l i t y o f the 
mil itary was not l o s t to the po l i t i c ians . They had taken 
care not . to condemn the mil i tary as an ins t i tu t i on . The 
speeches i n Parliament has been punctuated by words of 
gratitude to those who had remained l o y a l . This should 
have- been the time f o r r e f l e c t i o n to see how the ro l e of 
the mi l i tary oould have been rede f ine? in the now up*=coming 
new nation state. In Tanzania af ter such similar events, 
the Tanzania government had taken Bteps to ensure that 
o i v i l i an supremacy was not questioned that eas i l y . To 
demystify the monopoly of use of arms, national mil i tary 
service was introduced, the whole army, a t l e a s t o f f i c i a l l y , 
was disarmed and disbanded, the new army was to be soc ia l i zed 
and p o l i t i c i s e d into i t s new ro les and i t waB made" c lear 
where, ult imately, legitimate power l a y - within the ruling 
party. 
. I n the Ugandan,case, i n o i v i l i a n - mi l i tary r e l a t i o n s 
the leadership stuck to and invoked the simple Command-
Obey Model i n which the mi l i tary were an instrument o f the 
Btate; i t had to b e ' d i s c i p l i n e d and had a c lear chain of 
oommand. But they had no idea how th is could be operat ion-
a l i s e d . The absence •£. an * f f i c i a l operational formula 
f o r domesticating the Uganda mi l i tary meant that' i n the i r 
f a c t i o n a l b id f o r power, groups would have to work out the ir 
own pr ivate agenda f o r p o l i t i c i s i n g the mi l i tary on t h e i r 
.own terms, which, as we shal l see., has had t rag i c conse-
quences f o r the oountry. 
Expansion equipping and training o f the army proceeded 
•uninterrupted between the years 1964 and 1970. In the bourse 
o f s i x years four, ba t ta l i ons were es tab l i shed - the F i r s t 
Batta l ion at J in ja , the Second at Maroto, the Third at Mubende 
and the Fourth at Mbarara. In addition, there were other 
format ions . An Ordinance Depot was establ ished at MagamagaJ 
an A r t i l l e r y Regiment and Signals Training Wing a t Masindi.' 
A f t e r the confrontation with Sir Edward Muteesa, the Malire 
Mechanised Spec ia l i s t RecGormaissance Regiment was establ ished 
i n the former Kabaka' b Palaoe i n the centre of Kampala. This 
was an e l i t e mobile regiment well equipped with Armoured1 
Personnel Carriers , Shermans tanks and R e o o i l l e s s guns. 
Brigade headquarters were establ ished at Mbale f o r the E i r s t 
Infantry Brigade, and at Masaka f o r the Second Infantry 
Brigade. A Training Wing f o r r e c r u i t s and Senior.NCOb was 
es tab l i shed at J in ja . A School f o r paratroopers was 
establ ished at l u b i r i . With the assistance of I s r a e l i s , 
an Airfare© was established early in 1965 . 2 0 
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V/e should.emphasise that th i s expansion and equipment 
of the army was b a s i c a l l y a response to i n t e r n a l and herder _ 
problems, At the height o f the expansion, there were t roubles 
i n Karamoja, i n the " l o s t Counties", i n the heartland, 
Buganda where a State of Emergency had been declared a f t e r 
the events of 1966. I t ' i s vjorth noting that some of the'se 
bat ta l i ons were establ ished i n off near the epicentres of 
t roub le - Mbarar.a c l o s e to Bakonjo/Bamba county; Mubende, i n 
the " l o s t oounties" ; Moroto, 'in Karamoja. 
. The consequences ar i s ing out o f such a r e l a t i v e l y large 
mi l i tary establishment; within so sh6rt a time are no% hacd to 
see. -The army emerged as a highly v i s i b l e i n s t i t u t i o n and 
acquired a status i t . had never enjoyed b e f o r e ; The p o l i t i c a l 
leadership spoke e f i t ® i d e a r i n g l y and were only too ready to 
on 
give i t whatever i t . could a f f o r d . This i n turn must have 
generated into the army" a creeping sense' o f funct ional 
indespensabi l i ty . Ugandanisation of the o f f i c e r oorps had 
not quite gone according to the l eaders ' o r i g ina l timetable 
and as F e l i x Onama, Minister o f Internal A f f a i r s , had td 
' < 
admit. "Our Ugandan o f f i c e r s are, there fore , plunged i n t o 
work and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f a r larger, than they oould have 
* on 
expected i n the normal oourse of army career " . Be fore the 
o f f i c e r corps were drawn i n t o the power struggles of the 
mid-1960s, they had not gui te se t t l ed down to an e s p i r i t 
de oorps which, hope fu l ly , would have insulated them from 
p o l i t i c a l cross-pressures . . 
- 1 3 -
P o l i t i o a l Crises - the 1966 Cr i s i s 
Prom 1964 onward, tensions orupted within the c i v i l i a n 
p o l i t i o a l i n s t i t u t i o n s ' that were to turn Uganda into a 
v i r t u a l l y instLtut ionlees arena, with groups ignoring the 
formally establ ished r u l e s and seeking to impose rules only 
they themselves understood. The period between 1962 and 
1966 was one of apparent peace not necessar i ly beoause the 
leaders were oommitttfd" to working within the formally 
establ ished const i tut ional framework but simply beoause none 
of the l e a d e r s and the groups they represented f e l t strong 
enough to overthrow? the r u l e s o f the game. There were 
already signs within a few months a f t e r Independence to show 
that groups would play game only to the extent their, 
i n t e r e s t s would be: served. Addressing a press conference 
i n April 1963, Obote said, "The Uganda Peoples Congress w i l l 
never be dis lodged fjtfom power, by any mathematical mani-
pulat ions . " 2 - 5 What, i f these mathematical manipulations were 
carried out aooording to the established const i tut ional 
ru les? Obote was to provide the answers ear ly i n 1966. 
Tensions which ul t imately undermined constitutional ism 
arose from o o n f l i c t i n g interpretat ions of Buganda's 
autonomy, c o n f l i c t i n g interpretat ions of const i tut ional 
ru les of the game; the " l o s t Counties iBsue, and ole avages 
within the Uganda Peoples Congress, the ru l ing party. The 
sum t o t a l o f a l l these c r i s e s was to undermine c o n s t i t u -
tionalism and bring the mi l i tary into the p o l i t i o a l arena 
with oontending p o l i t i c a l actors vyiiig f o r support within 
the army. 
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The Uganda. Peoples Congress a l l i ance with the Kabaka Yefcka 
had r i sen out o f a des i re on the part of the two par t i es to 
reap maximum advantages out o f the a l l i anoe . Soon a f t e r 
forming the ooa l i t i on government, there were c o n f l i c t i n g 
interpretat ions of the cons t i tu t i on , with Buganda seeking to 
take over oentral government p o l i c e s tat ions i n Buganda. 
With r e l a t i o n s somewhat strained, the Buganda leadership 
be l ieved they oould play game by taking the oentral govern-
ment to oourt and/or withdraw from ./the a l l i a n c e , which 
provoked Obote into making the "no mathematical manipulations" 
statement already re fe r red to above.. 
By October. 1964, numerical ly , throught "orossings"- i n 
parliament from the Democratic Party and Kabaka Yekka, Obote 
was strong enough to al low the p l e b c i t e to take place i n . t h e 
"Dost Counties" o f Buyaga and Bugangaidzi, to the extreme 
annoyanoe of the Buganda government. In the p lebo i te the 
population voted for . return of the oountieB to Bunyoro. 
The announcement of the r e s u l t s o f the referendum was 
fo l lowed by the reaignation of Michael Kintu ' s government 
at Mmengo and widespread r i o t i n g i n Buganda. To contain 
the s i tuat ion , Obote warned that "maximum f o r o e " would be 
used to quel l any disturbances, which was l i t e r a l l y i n t e r -
preted by some men of the Spec ia l Force , a p a r a - d i l i t a r y 
organisat ion. A t Nakulabye, i n the suburbs of Kampala, 
Special Foroe men opened f i r e and k i l l e d an indeterminate 
member of people . 
The Nakulabye massacre, as i t has been oal led , i s notable 
f o r a number of reasons. I t marked the b e g i n n i n ^ o f use o f 
naked f o r o e i n the Uganda heart land. True, f o r o e had been used 
In the troubled marginal areas - Toro, Karamoja'and on the 
borders - but i t had never been so c lose to Kampala. The 
Incident also marked the beginnings « f a l ienat ion -between 
Buganda and the Obo ta government, which a l ienat ion was 
worsened by the provocative statements o f Onama, the Minister 
of Internal A f f a i r s and h i s #verprotectiveness of the atroc ious 
behaviour of the security f o r c e s i n Buganda. Although a 
Commission of Inquiry was set up to invest igate the Nakulabye 
massaore, r e l a t i o n s between Buganda"ahd the oentral government 
were never to be the fiame.2^ The -UPC-KY al l ianoe came: to 
an end. 
A l l had no£ well within the leadership of the Uganda 
Peoples Congress since the 1964 GuLtf UPC Delegates Conference 
where the popul i s t Secretary-General, John Kakonge was ousted 
and replaced 'by Grace I b i n g i r a . 2 ^ With the break up o f the 
UPC-KY Allianoe and massive "crossings11 to the government 
party, numerically the UPC looked formidable, but within this_ 
were inherent seeds of i n s t a b i l i t y . There emerged cleavages, 
mainly along regional l i n e s . The anti-Obote supporters took 
advantage of a motion a l l eg ing that Obote, Colonel Id i Amin, 
Nekyon and Fe l ix Onama had amassed wealth during Uganda/Congo 
border clashes to seek «<ensure of the Obote administration. 
The motion was seeking a Commission of Inquiry into these 
a l legat ions and suspension » f the Army Commander I d i Amin, 
from duty. With the support •£ the UPC parliamentary group, 
the motion was passed. • 
Clearly th is was a r e v o l t against Cbote. In the normal 
oourse o f events, s t r i c t l y within the const i tut ional ruled 
of the game, a number o f courses o f action were open to Obote, 
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namely, he oould have, d i sso lved Parliament and oal led f o r 
new e l e c t i o n s to seek a new mandate, formed a new government 
pending new e l e c t i o n s ' t h e date which he would determine , 
ca l l ed f o r an emergency UPC Delegates Conferenoe to explain 
h i s case and thereby "oorner" h i s opponents, or simply have 
awaited the outcome » f the Commission of Inquiry . But Obote 
chose the per i l ous but apparently eas ier path by arrest ing 
and detaining his- f ive , ministers and the Commander of the 
Army, Shaban Opolot, suspending the 1962 Independence 
CcvnstitUtion, declaring himself President, and introducing 
an Interim Constitution. The lone vo ice to reaot against 
a l l th i s was the Buganda government which *alled_ on him and 
hi.s government "to rem»va themselves from Buganda s o i l " . 
This provided Obote with a neat Passus b e l l i - he sent troerps 
to attack the Kabaka' & Palace vMch he occupied a f ter some 
f i g h t i n g . Sir. Edward"Mute6sa f l e d into e x i l e . Buganda was 
declared a Disturbed Area. 
Clearly, Obote was*•perating outside the established 
const i tut i ona l ru les o f the game. He had ignored the-
c i v i l i a n i n s t i t u t i o n s - he had not resolved the o r i s i s 
within parliament, nor through the party. He was. »nly able 
to do th i s because, he had won the support o f a fao t i on 
within the army under i t s Commander I d i Amin. While the 
c i v i l i a n p o l i t i o a l i n s t i t u t i o n s \»ere under s tra in through 
the -cleavages wo have out l ined •above, these oleavages Bpilled 
•••ver Into the army, with f a c t i o n ? al igning themselves with 
their, c i v i l i a n counterparts. Before h i s arrest , Shaban Opolot 
was reported to be aligned along with some "Bantu" o f f i c e r e 
with S ir Edward Mutessa and the, by now, detained ministers . 
Obote had. moved f a s t to purge the army o f suspeot o f f i c e r s 
and won the f u l l support o f I d i Amin. Thus he was able., 
with o r i t i o a l army support, to resolve a b a s i o a l l y 
const i tut ional issue by mi l i tary means. The army haft mounted 
the p o l i t i o a l stage. 
Obote 's Search f o r legitimacy -
The wav to the 19.7.1 Coup. 
After the defeat o f S i r Edward Muteesa and h i s 
n 
opponents within the party, Obote proceeded to de f ine h i s 
own rules of the game. He drafted the 1967 Constitution 
and presented i t to Parliament, whose, options were severely 
circumscribed, f o r , to any oasual observer, the mi l i tary 
were the meaningful power behind the throne. Uganda was i 
declared a Republic} monarchies were abol ished; a Presidency 
of which Obote hinjself was the incumbent, was es tab l i shed ; 
b r i e f l y , th i s was a unitary const i tut ion. 
With the defeat o f h i s opponents, the party i n d i sarray , 
and a cowed parliament, purely in naked physioal power terms, 
Obote was at the height of h i s power. Dizzy with success, 
he to ld h i s parliament: 
"Hon. Gentlemen, there i s nothing to 
regret ; what we have to deal with i s ' 
c l ear . What we have i s determination 
and i n the Government we are determined -
I have given you a f u l l statement, i t i s 
up to you to give the neoessary support. 
You have a b ig respons ib i l i t y , a l l o f us 
have a hig r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Some 
philosopher once said 'The midwife o f an 
o ld society pregnant with old so c i e ty 
pregnant with a new one i s f o r o e ' . I t i s 
my view that Buganda i s an^old s o c i e t y 
pregnant with a new one" . 2 ' 
In some sense, however, Obote was a prisoner of h i s 
own sucoess, as normally happens i n such s i tuat ions . The 
p o l i t i c o - c i v i l i a n i n s t i t u t i o n s were either oowed or i n 
disarray. The net e f f e c t o f t h i s success was to undermine 
the c i v i l i a n p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s which he so badly 
needed to l e g i t i m i s e h i s r u l e . Obote acquired a "Conqueror 
po 
mentality" r e f l e c t e d i n h i s speeches, act ions and act ions 
of h i s troops oocupying Buganda. -^ Ehe Kabaka1 s Palace t l u b i r i ) 
and the headquarters o f the Buganda Bukiiko (Parliament) 
were regarded as war booty and were converted into barraeks 
and army headquarters r e spec t i ve ly , the l a t t e r to be renamed 
"Republic House". The. atroc ious behaviour of the troops i n 
Buganda was a subject o f b i t t e r comments by Baganda members 
o f Parliament, some or the i r r e l a t i v e s J iv ing been v ict ims i of such behaviour:, but only to draw sarcast io barbed remarks 
oq 
from Mr, Onama, the Mini star o f Defence. 
For some two years Obote nursed the army as h i s c r i t i c a l 
power constituency. He took salutes at passing out' parades, 
attended weddings of high ranking o f f i c e r s , witnessed army 
o f , exerc i ses and,^ course, made speeches on these occasions. Jn 
a spaoe o f about one and a ha l f years, Obote v i s i t e d various 
mi l i tary i n s t a l l a t i o n s s ix t i m e s , A l l these, i n the normal 
course o f events, would not have, been out o f the ordinary 
since he was the Commander i n Chief , but they are t e l l i n g i n 
the context of the times we are discussing. His o f f i c e r s 
were well rewarded. In Apr i l 1968, Amin was promoted to 
Major-General and appointed Chief o f Defenoe Staf f and 
"Pr inc ipal Mi l i tary Adviser to the Cabinet and the Minister 
o f Defenoe"; Colonel Suleiman Hussein and Colonel Pierino 
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31 Yere Okoya were promoted to Brigadier .^ In general, the 
mi l i tary were doted upon mater ia l ly . 
The net e f f e c t o f introducing the new cons t i tu t i on 
by ex t ra - l ega l means was a p o l i t i c o - i n s t i t u t i o n a l void 
which Obote, a f t e r h i s phys ica l conso l idat ion , reoognised 
had to be f i l l e d . He must have rea l i sed that he was r id ing 
on the back o f a t i g e r and had, there fore , somehow, to 
devise means o f domesticating i t by "re-organising'.1 the 
Uganda Peoples Congress on h i s own terms, introducing 
formal po l i t l oo - cu l t tura l norms to. sustain him i n power and 
by bui lding oountervei l ing f o r c e s - t o neutra l i se the m i l i t a r y . 
We have already noted that immediately rbefore and a f t e r 
the 1966 Cris i s, the Uganda Peoples ' Congress was i n 
d isarry . The m a j o r - p o l i t i o a l question » f the day had been 
•'solved by the sword. In 1968, Obote ca l l ed a Delegates 
Confrence, the f i r s t s ince 1964, and def ined the ru les on 
h i s own terms. From past exper ieno^ he r e a l i s e d that the. 
party could provide an independent power base. He now 
sought to strengthen h i s hand over the party . At th i s 
0 conference, he was "rar-elected" President o f the Party for. 
a seven-year terra and was given the power to nominate 
32 
o f f i o i a l s who held • f f i c e «nly at h i s p leasure , In t h i s 
way the party was dependent on Obote, not vioe-vers-a. For 
tile next three years, u n t i l he was overthrown, one cannot 
say that high p o l i c y dec is ions originated from party organs. 
The party simply served as a forum .through which, - p o l i c i e s 
worked out by Obote, were simply l eg i t imised . I t I s worth 
noting that the Common Man's Charter and the aooompanying 
Move To The l e f t dbouments had a l l been drafted outside the 
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party organs, and were -tthen ""debated on" and approved i n the 
party f o r a . The c r i t i c a l nerve centre of power remained 
the army,. 
The introduct ion o f the 1967 Constitution and abo l i t i on 
of the monarchies had l e f t a p o l i t i c o - c u l t u r a l void which 
had to be f i l l e d . There were even no formal p o l i t i c o -
cultural values to sustain the formal p o l i t i c a l arrangements. 
For a p o l i t i c a l system to survive i t cannot depend on show 
o f physical f o r ce alone; i t must b£ backed by a core of 
p o l i t i o a l values, at l e a s t , among the p o l i t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t 
soc ia l f o r o e s . With h i e opponents i n pr ison, or dead, or 
i n e x i l e , or nulky, Obo-bs made some attempts to introduce 
documentary i d e o l o g i c a l bases f o r the new order i n a p o l i t i c a l 
environment t h a t was l a t e n t l y h o s t i l e . This he did by trying 
to i d e n t i f y the "enemies" and by introducing the Common, Men's 
Charter and the attendant documents.^ 
We have already seen that the 1966 c r i s i s had been 
sparked o f f by a r e v o l t within the UPC leadership . Basical ly 
the o r i s i s had been over. Obote 's leadership and h i s 
oolleagues had been out to have", him removed. In control of 
the mass media, the regime, set about portraying the 1966 
events as a revolution against f o r c e s of "Imperialism", 
"Feudalism" and i n defence of "tjie "Compon Man".. Sir Edward 
Muteesa was picked on as the be te -no i r . The s e m i - o f f i c i a l 
ideologue of the regime was Akena-Adoko, Head of the 
i n t e l l i g e n c e service , euphemistirally ca l l ed the General 
Service Unit. In h i s book, The 1966 Cr i s i s he provided 
the i d e o l o g i o a l rat ionale f o r the "Revo lut ion" .^ ' 
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The Common Man's Charter and the Move To the l e f t 
documents were supposed to herald a new p o l i t i c a l era i n 
which the Common Man's i n t e r e s t s were paramount, in which 
the gap between r i c h and poor would be narrowed, or c losed 
a l together , and one i n which there would be meaningful 
p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n . A t h e o r e t i c a l l y ingenious formula 
f o r e l e c t i n g members of Parliament and the President was 
worked out . 
The establishment and strengthening of the General 
Service Unit and the Special Force in the l a t e min-1960a 
were an apparent attempt to have them as counterve.tling 
f o r c e s to the mi l i ta ry . Much as the army had been pampered, 
Obote was not quite too sure o f them. Or ig ina l ly the 
General Service Unit had been set up as a "counter-espionage" 
organisat ion , e s p e c i a l l y to watch «ver the a c t i v i t i e s o f 
f o re ign miss ions . But as the internal p o l i t i c a l o r i s e s 
i n t e n s i f i e d , i t s a c t i v i t i e s became^.increasingly domestic . 
The members o f the service were trained i n the Soviet Union, 
Czechoslovakia and I s r a e l . The Special Foroe had been b u i l t 
under c o l o n i a l rule to handle domestic problems too b i g f o r 
the p o l i c e to handle. A f t e r Independence, as domestic 
problems beoame more intense , the Special Foroe was expanded 
and equipped i n mi l i tary fash ion . The bui ld ing up of the 
General Servioe Unit and the Special Force was not eas i l y 
l o s t to the mi l i tary . With a subdued Buganda and without 
any aot ive or potent ia l power oentres to challenge Obote' b 
ru le , the mi l i tary must have come to very unoomfortable 
conclus ions . In the l a s t two years before the 1971 coup, 
r e l a t i o n s between the General Service Unit and the Special 
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Force on the one hand and the mi l i tary on the other were 
strained. Immediately a f ter the January 1971 ooup, members 
of the General Service. Unit and Special Force were rounded 
up and the «rganisatLons were disbanded. 
These attempts to reorganise the party, to introduce' 
new p o l i t i c a l formulae and bui ld countervai l ing f o r c e s to 
neutral ise the mil itary did not go far. to regular ise the 
Obote rule and make i t l e s s dependent on the army. This 
f a i l u r e may be attributed to a l a t e n t l y h o s t i l e or apathetic 
p o l i t i c a l environment, to the highly personal ised o i v i l i a n 
Ins t i tut i ona l arenas f o r handling c o n f l i c t s and the power 
struggle s h i f t from c i v i l i a n to mi l i tary i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
In spite of h is physical mi l i tary v i c t o r y over Bugand'a, 
Obote never quite mad® any p o l i t i o a l inroads i n t o Buganda. 
The Baganda remained subdued, b i t t e r and sullcy. Unti l the 
1971 ooup, Buganda was i n a State of Emergency. And c ' 
th is i s the economically, cu l tura l ly and p o l i t i c a l l y 
s trateg io heartland ef the country. Because Buganda was 
e i ther p i l i t i o a l l y demobilized or subdued, th i s l e f t the. 
legit imacy of the Obote regime rather tenuous. P r o f e s s o r 
Gingyera-Pinyowa, lamenting the quarrel between Obote and 
Amin to whioh he par t ia l l y at tr ibutes the JanugjTy 1971 ooup, 
does not see any corre lat ion between the p o l i t i o a l margin-
a l ! sation of the Baganda and the c o u p . ^ True, the Baganda 
had been disarmed, but the state of Emergency i n Buganda 
made Obote more unduly dependent on the army f o r f e a r o f 
domestic upheavals and th is , in turn, generated within the 
mil i tary a sense of p o l i t i c o - f u n c t i o n a l ind i sponsab i l i t y 
and relegated the cruc ia l importance of c i v i l i a n p o l i t i c a l 
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i n s t i t u t i o n s as l e g i t i m i z i n g instruments into the background. 
The way the Baganda> cheered Amin immediately, a f ter the 
coup helped to l eg i t imise the Amin coup domestioally and 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y . 
The p o l i t i o a l organs within the. ru l ing party and 
Parliament had been e i t h e r so personalised or. oowed that 
no meaningful reso lut ion of p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t s could have 
taken p lace . The ascendancy of the mi l i tary oould have been 
oontained i f the i n s t i t u t i o n s had been meaningfully 
strengthened, but strengthening of o iv i l i . an . ins t i tu t i ons , 
would i n themselves, have undermined Obote1s power pos i t i on . 
Meaningful power struggles sh i f ted from o i v i l i a n p o l i t i c a l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s to the m i l i t a r y . Here, Obote was placed at 
a tremendous disadvantage i n that th i s arena Was too closed 
to him to f r e e l y operate. He had l e f t two of h i e . o l o s e s t 
supporters, Onama and Amin too l ong i n s trateg ic p o s i t i o n s . 
As r e l a t i o n s between Amin and Obote soured, other i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
c i v i l i a n soo ia l f o r c e s simply he lp l e ss ly assumed spectators ' 
r o l e s . Probably Obote would have saved himself i f he had 
played the game Marshall Sta l in and Nikita Nkrushohev>- had 
played on Marshall Zhuk#v that i s , the hero should have 
been removed prec i se ly at the he ight of h i s s u o o e s s . ^ 
Tensions within the mi l i ta ry , tensions whioh aulminated 
into the January, 1971 coup, arose from i n t e r - s e r v i c e 
r i v a l r i e s , generational cleavages within the o f f i o e r oorps, 
p o l o r i s a t i o n s within the mi l i tary along ethnio l i n e s and 
clumsy attempts on the part of Obote to have Amin neutral ised 
i n the army. We have already touphed on the r i v a l r i e s 
between the Special Force and the General Servioe Unit tn 
- 24 -... 
the one hand and the army on the other. The strengthening 
of the General Service Unit and Special-Foroe simply 
alienated some elemesnts within the army f u r t h e r . 
As the army became more func t i ona l ly oomplex, -there 
was a need to r e c r u i t and t ra in o f f i c e r s with a r e l a t i v e l y 
higher education. There were some signs that some of these 
younger men were increas ing ly coming o j o ser to oommend 
pos i t i ons . Tensions within the o f f i c e r corps between the 
r e l a t i v e l y well educated o f f i o e r s and o f f i c e r s from the 
ranss were oommon knowledge at the time. Coupled with t h i s 
was the po lar i sa t i on within the army along ethnio l i n e s . 
By the l a t e 1960s there were signs that Obote was seeking 
to bui ld a smaller and more r e l i a b l e , hope fu l l y , base among 
the Achol is and lang i s as evidenced by the s t ra teg i c command 
pos i t i ons o f f i o e r s from these groups held and the e l i t e , 
uni ts the men manned. Amin responded by carrying out 
recruitments of h i s own and by surrounding himself with 
o f f i c e r s he oould t r u s t . T h e r e then fo l lowed the mysterious 
murder of Brigadier Okoya and death i n a oar "aocident" o f 
Lieutenant-Colonel Omoya. 
In l a t e 1970, Obote took advantage o f Amin's absence 
to carry out promotions within the army, which promotions 
l e f t no doubt that Amin was on the way out . At th i s stage, 
with the army highly po lar i sed , i t was a question o f who 
struck f i r s t . While Obote was away i n Singapore, attending 
the Commonwealth Heads of State Conference, I d i Anin staged 
h i s ooup d ' e t a t . 
In the l i g h t of the processes by which the mi l i tary 
» aoquired v i s i b i l i t y and assumed a nakedly a c t i v i s t r o l e i n 
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Ugandan p o l i t i o s , we may argue that the Amin ooup and the 
p o l i c i e s he persuad after, the ooup, pushed to a l o g i c a l 
t conc lus i on trends set by Obote, which increas ingly rendered 
p o l i t i f i a l inst i tut ions - f o r reso lv ing c o n f l i c t s powerless. 
By the time Amin assumed power, they were so f r a g i l e that 
i t needed a simple announcement to have them banned. 
Party p o l i t i o a l a c t i v i t i e s were suspended, and Parliament 
was d isso lved , and i n the next eight years, unt i l he was 
overthrown, a l l i n s t i t u t i o n s - c i v i l i a n and mil i tary -
were subjected to the d i c ta tes of I d i Amin. 
The Amin regime las ted Bome nine years and yet i t did 
not" aperate through i n s t i t u t i o n s f o r reso lv ing o o n f l i c t s 
short o f use o f f o r c e or t e r r o r . Terror was used as an 
instrument o f domestic p o l i c y . Again, t h i s pushed to a 
l o g i o a l conclusion a precedent set by Obote when he used 
the army as an instrument of domestic p o l i c y . True, Obote 
was r e l a t i v e l y more sophist icated to give, h i s courses o f 
ac t ion some semblance o f legit imacy ^through formal organs 
of the party and government. 
The Mi l i tary i n the Post-1979 Regimes 
The removal o f I d i Amin did not re legate the mi l i tary 
i n the background. After, a l l , he had been removed by mi l i tary 
means - by a combination o f the Tanzanian Peoples Defence 
Poroe and Ugandan troops. V/e shall only discuss the p o l i t i o s 
Pront 
of the Uganda National l i berat i on /and the Obote regime to 
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the extent that the mi l i tary inf luenced the p o l i t i o s . In 
these regimes, the mi l i tary was v i r t u a l l y the king-maker 
u n t i l , with the ooming i n of the "Okel los" , the kingmaker 
became k ing , . Yusufu Lule and Godfrey Binaisa were removed 
part ly because they had al ienated the kingmakers and Milton 
Obote reassumed the Presidency mainly with the support » f 
the Mi l i tary Commission. The orchestrated Deoember, 1980 
e l e c t i o n s were simply meant to l eg i t imise the de fa c to State 
of A f f a i r s . ? 
A f t e r the 1978/79 "Kagera War", Ugandan leaders were 
highly ambivalent towards the Mi l i ta ry . With the defeat of 
- I d i Amin'b army, there was some chance f o r r e d e f i n i t i o n o f 
the r o l e o f the mi l i ta ry i n the newly " l i bera ted " oountry. 
•On the one hand they Bawr the mi l i tary as the most e f f e c t i v e 
instrument i n the removal o f I d i Amin and.as a c r i t i c a l 
f a c t o r i n the power: struggles that ensued;on the other they 
saw the mi l i tary as a monster that oould swallow them i f 
they did not , somehow) try to domosticate i t . As l i b e r a t i n g 
instrument, the new Uganda National L iberat ion Army enjoyed 
a honeymoon re la t ionsh ip with the leaders ahd o i v i l i a n s a l i k e . 
As a c r i t i c a l facter . i n the ensuing power struggles , the army 
was the o b j e c t o f ingra t ia t ing attention from various 
p o l i t i o a l f o r o e s . Hence, suoh l a b e l s as "Museveni 's", 
"Obote 's " and "Muwanga*b s o l d i e r s were f r e e l y bandied out . 
The Ugandan leaders ' a t t i tudes towards the mi l i tary as 
a l i b e r a t i n g instrument, as a c r i t i c a l f a c t o r i n the power 
game, and then as a monster that had to».be domestioated were 
highly contradictory . Pact ional vying f o r support within 
the mi l i tary implied a sense of p o l i t i o a l he lp less and 
hopelessness i n the absence of v iab le c i v i l i a n p o l i t i c a l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s to oontain the m i l i t a r y . Under the UN1F, steps 
were taken i n an apparent e f f o r t to subordinate the mi l i ta ry 
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to c i v i l i a n contro l . The general thinking among some o f the 
the UN1F leadership was that, a future Ugandan mi l i tary 
monster could ohly be prevented from emerging i f e f f o r t s 
were made to ,strengthen the UN1F as an organisat ion by! 
proportional ethnic representation i n the new army, having 
a l i t e r a t e army with an educated o f f i c e r oorps, representation 
of the mi l i tary i n the UNLF organs and Parliament, p o l i t i -
c i s ing the army and bui lding a peoples' m i l i t i a as a counter-
v e i l i n g f o r c e . 
The tentative: steps or ideas to .domesticate the new army 
e i ther generated h o s t i l i t y from various p o l i t i c a l f o r c e s or 
were introduced into an environment that completely mis -
understood the Ideal o b j e c t i v e s of such steps or ideas . 
The apparent assumption behind strengthening the UNIF v i s a v i s 
the mi l i tary was t h a t the army could only be neutral ised f f 
there was a strong c i v i l i a n organisation. • But, as we have 
discussed elsewhere,^0 f a c t i o n s within the UNLF had l i t t l e 
i n common beyond the l a b e l . Proportional ethnio r e p r s -
sentation was I /u le ' s i d e a . ' ' 1 His «pponcnts were quick to 
point out that, since Buganda and the Southern areas .s 
generally are numerically powerful, these areas would have 
fome out at greater numerical advantage and that th i s was 
a blatant way of one group establishing hegemony over the 
army. The area that would have been most adversely a f f e c t e d , 
i f l u l e ' s ideas had been implemented, would have been the 
North general ly , and Acholi and lango s p e o i f i o a l l y . And 
th is inev i tab ly would have entailed a ohange i n the balance 
of mi l i tary and p o l i t i o a l power, f o r which the Northern 
leadership were not prepared'. Henry Makmot c l ear ly echoed 
these f e a r s i n the National Consultative Council and invoked 
the Doctrine of Ethno-functionalism: 
"-There are t r ibes which are muoh, much 
bigger than others ; so you could expeot 
about, hal f of the army coming from that 
t r i b e or . the t r ibe which i s more f o r t u -
nate or t r ibes vdiioh are re lated - And 
i n Uganda) - I stressed th is when I c o n t r i -
buted to th i s debate much e a r l i e r i n May/ 
June- that there are seotions of the 
population who jus t cannot f i g h t even i f 
they are so ld i e rs , ( i n t e r j e c t i o n s ) . And 
I w i l l s tress th i s that there i s evidence 
to that e f f e c t . Even i n the reoent 
f i g h t i n g therer I s evidence that some people 
just oould no t Btand f i r e s ( S i o ) . This 
I am stressing because pract i ce i s d i f f e r e n t 
from theory"^2 
The searoh f o r a l i t e r a t e army and an eduoated o f f i c e r 
oorps was a response, to the low l e v e l s o f l i t e r a c y and 
eduoation i n the Amin army and i t s o f f i o e r oorps, r e o p e c t -
i v e l y , to whioh some leaders attr ibuted the b e s t i a l i t y o f 
Amin's army. Of. course, opposit ion to th i s proposal , muted 
as i t was, was based on p a r t i c u l a r i s t i c considerat ions. 
P o l i t i o a l groups, making a rush f o r support within the army 
and seeking to establ ish their bases within, could not * 
have had eduoation and general l i t e r a c y as important 
c r i t e r i a , par t i cu lar ly i f they considered them p o l i t i c o -
mi l i tary disadvantages. Certainly, Lule earned the ac t ive 
h o s t i l i t y o f the predominatly Northern core of the UNlt1 
who had marohed from the Uganda/Tanzania border . Again, 
implementation of the educational c r i t e r i a would have 
enta i led a ohange i n the p o l i t l o o - m i l i t a r y balanoe of j « w e r 
to the disadvantage of the Northern leadership . 
The UNDP leaders i n Moshi saw that they had to come 
to gr ips with r e a l i t y by reoognising the UNDA i n the making 
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as an i n t e r e s t group. Not only would i n t e r e s t s pecul iar ' 
to the mi l i ta ry be taken .care of Tby mi l i tary representatives , 
but mi l i ta ry representat ion would also enable the mi l i tary 
to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the decision-making processes i n the top 
c i v i l i a n organs. But t h i s was simply an i d e a l . In the 
f a c t i o n a l power, struggles that ensued within the UNLF and 
UNIA, the mi l i tary representat ives i n e v i t a b l y i d e n t i f i e d 
themselves with f a c t i o n s -or par t i es they supported. 
• .In Obote ' s b id f o r power, c r i t i c a l elements within the 
Mi l i tary Commission c l e a r l y demonstrated where their sympathies 
l ay by supporting Obote. 
P o l i t i c i s a t i o n of the mi l i tary and establishment of 
a peoples ' m i l i t i a were Museveni's i d e a s , when he was 
Minister o f Defence. In h i s p o l i c y paper, submitted to the 
National Consultative Council , he argued f o r a p o l i t i c i s e d 
army and a peoples ' m i l i t i a on the grounds t h a t . a l l armies 
are, i n any oase, p o l i t i c a l and that a 
peoples ' m i l i t i a was one o f the surest guarantees f o r domestic 
s t a b i l i t y , secur i ty and demooratisation o f the instruments o f 
coerc ion , a l l o f which would maker, i t d i f f i c u l t f o r any 
adventurer to hold the population to. ransom by staging a. coup 
d ' e t a t . 4 3 
Given the f a c t i ona l p o l i t i c s o f the UNDP and the f r a g -
mented nature of the UN1A, Museveni's i deas of a p o l i t i c i s e d 
army and a peoples ' m i l i t i a were a l i t t l e too advanced. 
True, h i s ideas were supported i n the National Consultative 
Council , but expressions » f support jrere simply declarat ions 
of i n t e n t i o n and were-not any c l o ser to the p o l i t i c a l and 
mi l i tary r e a l i t i e s preva i l ing ^.t the time. .The underlying 
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assumption of a p o l i t i c i s e d army i s that there i s e i ther 
a hegemonio party or a residual consensus of internal i sed 
p o l i t i c a l ideas which can be inculcated, hold the mi l i tary 
as an i n s t i t u t i o n together, and that the mi l i tary i s ready, 
as a resu l t , to accept the supremacy of c i v i l i a n p o l i t i c a l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s . In the case of a peoples' m i l i t i a , where th i s 
was implemented, espec ia l ly in Achol i , the m i l i t i a were 
simply personal f o l l owers of individuals or f a c t i ons and 
i 4 
were sources of i n s t a b i l i t y as events were l a t e r to prove. 
That e f f o r t s by the UHIiA to domesticate the mi l i tary 
had miserably f a i l e d was i l l u s t r a t e d by the assumption of 
power by the Mil i tary Commission, whose p o l i t i o a l sympathies, 
as we have seen, lay with the Obote UPC. The mi l i tary were, 
thus, able to demonstrate that they s t i l l had the veto power 
to determine which rules were preferable to i t . 
On h i s seoond assumption of power, Obote found himself 
i n t}ie same old trap, the same trap which ult imately had l e d 
to h i s downfall, namely, having to use the mi l i tary as h i s 
c r i t i o a l . bas i c constituency. True, he had assumpad power 
through appearances of an e l e c t i o n which h i s party had 
"won", but the o r i t i c a l power behind the throne was the 
mi l i ta ry . The Uganda Peoples Congress continued to simply 
play the funct ions of l eg i t imisa t i on a s i t had done before 
the 1971 d ' ebao le . 
Within a few months of h i s assumption of o f f i c e , he 
was sadded with a g u e r r i l l a war of a t t r i t i o n i n mainly the 
s trateg io heartland •£ Buganda.* In h i s seoond struggle f o r 
power, he t r ied the strategy of encircloment o f Buganda, 
a strategy which had paid"'•ff well in h is f i r s t bid f o r power 
during the early 1960 s / 5 As a r e s u l t o f t h i s success fu l 
s t rategy , Buganda had been f o r c e d to break out o f the 
enciroiement by seeking an a l l i a n c e with the UPC, an a l l i ance 
at the time t a o t i c a l , but which turned out to be d isastrous 
f o r Buganda and, eventua l ly , f o r Uganda. But the Buganda 
o f the 1980s was r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t from that « f the 1960s. 
Surrounded as they were during and immediately a f t e r the 
Deoember, 1980, e l e c t i o n s , to break out o f the encirc lement , 
the Baganda were not prepared to seek a par ley with Obote. 
They sought to break tut o f the encirc lement by armed u p -
r i s i n g l e d by v a r i o u s groups, the most prominent o f which, 
i t turned out , was the National Resistance Movement l e d by 
Y«weri Museveni. Obote swallowed the b a i t by seeking a 
m i l i t a r y s o l u t i o n to the upr i s ing which, with the advantage 
o f h inds ight , turned out to be a d i s a s t e r f o r Obote, beoause 
the 1980s were d i f f e r e n t from the mid-1960s when Obote 
depended b a s i o a l l y on the mi l i ta ry to r u l e . 
The 1980s were d i f f e r e n t f o r a number of reasons . 
F i r s t l y , f o r o e was too d ispersed f o r him to use i t e f f e c t -
i v e l y as on instrument o f domestic p o l i c y ; seoondly, f o r a l l 
the appearances o f e l e c t i o n s , l eg i t imacy was too tenuous 
i n the s t r a t o g i o heart land; t h i r d l y , h i s clumsy attempts 
to bu i ld the army as a o r i t i o a l b a s i c const i tuency boomeranged; 
f o u r t h l y , resources were too soaroe to be a l l o c a t e d to h i s 
f r i e n d s and enemies i n c i v i l i a n l i f e and the army to be of 
p o l i t i c a l u t i l i t y ; and, f i f t h l y , the g u e r r i l l a war had such 
a heavy t o l l on M s mill-Gary supporters that t h i s l e d to 
' p o l a r i s a t i o n s within the m i l i t a r y , vjhich culminated i n t o 
the July , 1985 coup. 
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drove to take Kampala on a broad Saturday morning, 
on the 27th July 1985. 
Conclusion: The "Okellos"- and The MBM Victory, 
In t h i s paper we have argued that the p o l i t i c a l 
v i s i b i l i t y and eventual a c t i v i s t r o l e o f the mi l i tary i n 
Uganda have been the r e s u l t o f f a i l u r e on the part o f Uganda 
leaders to bui ld i n s t i t u t i o n s capable o f domesticating 
c i v i l c o n f l i c t s , but have chosen to b u i l d the mi l i tary i n 
response to internal p o l i t i o o - m i l i t a r y c r i s e s . Yfith the 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l vacua that were created by Obote and Amin, 
the mi l i ta ry assumed such r o l e s that i t could e i t h e r play 
king-maker, or play king. The coming i n of the Okellos i n 
July, 1985, created a highly po lar ised p o l i t i o o - m i l i t a r y 
s i tuat ion i n which the antagonist ic p o l i t i o o - m i l i t a r y f o r c e s , 
the Okel los and NRM, appeared so evenly balanced that 
Uganda appeared well s e t f o r a prolonged o i v i l war. 
The Nairobi Peace Talks which dragged on f o r some four 
months arose part ly out o f a r e a l i s a t i o n on the part o f the 
contending f o r o e s that, f e r the time beings they could not 
d i c ta te terms and part ly i n order f o r the antagonist ic 
f o r o e s to mob i l i se resources f o r a f i n a l showdovm. With 
f o r c e s apparently evenly balanced, and without a formula 
to regulate re la t ions between them, the Nairobi Peace- Talks 
were aimed at working out some kind « f modus operandi but 
the terms of the peace accord which was eventually signed 
were so complicated f o r the contract ing p a r t i e s and i n v o l v e d 
so much give and take that none of the groups, in the 
circumstances prevai l ing , oould, any way, have adhered to i t . 
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The Nairobi Peace Talks gave time to the two parties 
.to prepare f o r a f i n a l showdown. In their pronouncements 
and their ac t i ons the Okel los demonstrated that, i f given 
a chanoe, they would pre fer a showdown and d ic tate . the i r own 
terms. They af fected ' p o l i t i o a l and mi l i tary appointments 
designed to keep the NRM out, they sought a l l ianoes with 
mi l i tary groups that were h o s t i l e to the NRM and oarried 
large scale mobi l i sat ion . The NRM and the ir mi l i tary arm, 
NRA, were not ogught napping. They also used the Nairobi 
Peace Talks to in ternat iona l i se their message, oarry out 
large scale mobi l izat ion and extend the ir oontrol o f areas. 
By the end of Beoember, 1985, they were poised on the p u t -
sk ir ts o f Kampala. 
There are a number of impl icat ions ar is ing out o f the 
NRM v i c to ry , which impl i cat ions are l i k e l y to have a strong 
bearing on o i v i l i a n - m i l i t a r y re la t i ons and the bui lding of 
p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . The armed upris ing was a reac t i on 
against the use of the mi l i tary a^ an instrument of domestic 
p o l i c y , dating back to 1966; the movement grew beoause o f 
a po l i t i c o - sn i l i tary symbiotic re lat ionship between the 
National Resistence Army and the c i v i l i a n population; 
and ^the NRM v i c t o ry has exploded the myth of "martial Tr ibes " , 
a myth propagated by the colonial ism and eohoed by the 
Odas, the Lakidis and the MaJAiots, and marked a s h i f t i n 
the balance of p o l i t l o o - m i l i t a r y power from marginal groups 
to the s trateg io heartland groups. 
Throughout th i s paper we have seen that the mi l i tary 
has been a o r i t i o a l actor i n p o l i t i c a l developments i n 
country, since 1966 and th i s eventually provoked an armed 
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upris ing from the population. Martin O k e l l o ' s prophecy has 
been f u l f i l l e d . The movement suooeeded because the c i v i l i a n s 
among whom the movement took m o t s , rea l i sed i t was, 
u l t imate ly , i n their physical in teres t to support the 
g u e r r i l l a movement. This early symbiotic re lat ionship then 
may provide bases f o r an .integrated c i v i l i a n - mi l i tary 
re la t i onsh ip . This may change the ro l e o f the mi l i tary 
which, h i ther to , had been predatory. Coupled with t h i s , 
the NRM v io to ry has wrested monopoly of the use of f o r c e -
from marginal groups i n whose interes t i t was not to build 
v iab le p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
The r e s u l t may be then a s ituation i n which there i s 
a balance of s o c i » - p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y f o r c e s , a s i tuat ion 
i n which no one group w i l l f e e l oonfldent to d ic tate terms 
beoause i t h a S monopoly of the means of coerc ion . Such a 
s i tuat ion , augurs well f o r building Viable c i v i l i a n p o l i t i c a l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s f o r domesticating c o n f l i c t . The experience 
of the l a s t twelve months, since the NRM assumed power, has 
shown that the National Resistance Movement also rea l i se 
that, i n the f i n a l analysis , they cannot d istate terms and 
are i n the process of working out a formula that can acco -
mmodate c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s . S t a b i l i t y w i l l depend an 
a r e a l i s a t i o n by c o n f l i c t i n g s o c i o - p o l i t i o o - m i l i t a r y f o r c e s 
that use o f ooereion i n se t t l ing domestic o o n f l i o t s i s s e l f -
de feat ing , as Obote has, hopefully, l earnt at the oost of h i s 
" throne" , 
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